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Abstract
We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing
aid policies, public housing units and housing vouchers. Land is differentiated by both residential
accessibility and local public goods, and the provision levels of local public goods are determined
by property tax revenues and neighborhood compositions. Households differ in their incomes
and preferences for local public goods. Housing aid policies are financed by general income
taxes. We discuss how the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable, in
addition to the numbers and sizes of units, and argue that vouchers not only cause less distortion
for social welfare compared to public housing, but may also improve overall welfare.
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1 Introduction
Governments intervene in housing markets all around the world. The forms of these interventions
differ significantly across and within economies.1 Although housing aid policies are among the most
expensive welfare programs in many countries, our understanding of their effects is very limited. The
existing research is mainly empirical and typically evaluates the effects of particular programs on
certain outcomes (e.g., labor supply). Overlooked general equilibrium effects—which may introduce
distortions that counterweigh the benefits measured in partial equilibrium analyses—and program-
specific details can burden such analyses at times. Given the enormous costs of “experiments”
that will provide clear answers to numerous important questions, there are many potential benefits
to studying rich theoretical models that enable thorough comparisons of the effects of alternative
policy proposals.
We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing
aid policies, subsidized units and housing vouchers. A novel feature of our model is that the land
is differentiated by both residential accessibility and local public goods.2 Households differ in their
incomes and preferences for one local public good, viz. education. The quality of education in a
1See Smeeding et al. (1993) for cross country comparisons. Whereas the United States tends to provide cash
subsidies (Olsen, 2003, comments on the large number of different programs in the U.S.), European countries are
more inclined to directly provide physical structures, even when the spending is comparable (Priemus, 2000). In 2001,
the United States spent slightly above 1.5% of its GDP on public aid on housing, and the counterpart in France is
similar, comprising slightly above 1.7% of the GDP (Laferre`re and Le Blanc, 2006). Yet the construction-subsidized
rental sector (mainly the habitation a` loyer mode´re´, or HLM in short) accommodates 17% of the households in
France, with less than 2% for the U.S. counterpart. Even a simple policy like a cash subsidy can lead to very different
outcomes when institutional details differ. For instance, Priemus (2001) states that whereas in the U.S., 100% of
the additional rent is paid by tenants, tenants in the Netherlands only pay 25%, and the government is responsible
for the rest. Moreover, in the Netherlands, there is no waiting list, and the rent subsidy is perceived as a “right.”
As a result, the number of applicants rose from 348,000 in 1976 to 922,000 in 1996. In 1998, there were more than
a million households receiving a housing allowance, out of more than 6 million households in the Netherlands. See
Malpezzi (2012) for a post-2007-8 evaluation of U.S. housing policies.
2Two attributes that households consider when making residential choices, accessibility and local public goods
and services, have traditionally been studied separately. Urban land use frameworks (based on pioneering works of
Alonso, 1964; Muth, 1969; and Mills, 1972) focused on the implications of the trade-off between accessibility and
space, and predicted households locating in rings around the center according to their types (see Straszheim, 1987,
and Fujita, 1999, for a review of this literature), whereas Tiebout models focused on the implications of local public
goods and services (e.g., Tiebout, 1956; Ellickson, 1971; Epple, Filimon, and Romer, 1984, 1993; Nechyba, 1999,
2000; Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996; among others), predicting strong stratification based on income and preferences
for local public goods. The documented household sorting is stronger than that predicted by urban models and
weaker than the sorting predicted by Tiebout models (Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport, 2000). There have been some
recent attempts to merge the two lines of research and obtain a more realistic description of urban location patterns
(de Bartolome and Ross, 2003; Hanushek and Yilmaz, 2007). Our approach, based on Hanushek and Yilmaz (2007),
allows us to account for both key attributes in residential decision-making simultaneously, providing us with a rich
model that captures several essential features of urban spatial structure.
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neighborhood depends on both the composition of the population in the neighborhood and on the
local educational expenditures. The expenditures are determined by property taxes, the rates of
which are chosen by neighborhood residents through majority voting. The housing aid policies are
financed by general income taxes. We study equilibrium outcomes such as rents, distribution of
households within and across neighborhoods, and school qualities, and pay particular attention to
welfare.
We first present the baseline equilibrium with no government intervention in the housing market.
We observe a sorting of households according to their incomes and preferences in each neighborhood
with respect to location. We also observe a (partial) sorting across neighborhoods. We then
introduce public housing into the model. Public housing programs exhibit large variations from
one market to another, and sometimes even within the same market. We combine some common
elements of the widespread applications to construct the program that we adopt. Public housing
units typically cause property-tax losses to the hosting neighborhood, and households respond by
a stronger sorting across neighborhoods. In addition, the forced location and land consumption
of public housing residents deviate their numeraire consumption and labor supply choices away
from the efficient market allocation. Rents increase in general, and so does the education quality
gap between neighborhoods. The result is a decrease in overall welfare. We then provide public
housing units at alternative locations and find that, in fact, location matters. Our results suggest
that household sorting further increases as public housing units move further from the city center
because the fiscal burden problem created by public housing becomes more serious (and overall
welfare decreases further) as the spatial distribution and choices of households further deviate from
that of the “no-intervention” equilibrium.
As an alternative housing aid policy, we consider providing housing vouchers to the same partici-
pants and present comparisons. We find housing vouchers to be superior to public housing units
in terms of welfare. The difference results mainly from two issues associated with public housing
units: 1. the implications of stronger sorting between neighborhoods as a result of the fiscal burden
problem that arises in the neighborhood that hosts the (property-tax exempt) public housing units;
and 2. the deviations from the efficiency of market allocation caused by forced location and lot size
choices under public housing.
The findings of this paper suggest that the intuition behind basic microeconomics textbook dis-
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cussions for “in-cash versus in-kind” applies to a more general environment, one that includes
endogenous local public goods, peer group externalities, and accessibility. The framework devel-
oped in this paper can be adapted to compare public housing and/or vouchers to other housing aid
programs, or to compare the outcomes of any single program under different institutional details.
2 The Model
We incorporate a Tiebout economy into Alonso’s (1964) basic land use framework. Households
in a monocentric city work at the Central Business District (CBD hereafter) and reside in the
surrounding area. The distance of home to the workplace matters because of the pecuniary and
time costs of commuting to work. A straight line that goes through the CBD (e.g., a river)
divides the city into two jurisdictions, which we call east (e) and west (w). Each jurisdiction
provides its residents a local public good, education. The provision level (quality) of education
in a neighborhood is endogenous, and depends on both the composition of the households in the
neighborhood and local spending (property tax revenues, the rates of which are determined by
majority voting). Agents can move, and hence the tax rates and expenditure levels may differ
between jurisdictions. We discuss this model in further detail below.
2.1 Households
Households choose a neighborhood (east or west), a location in that neighborhood (r, distance to
the CBD), lot size s > 0, leisure l ∈ [0, 24], and the consumption level of a composite consumer good
z. The preferences of a household can be represented by the utility function U(q, s, z, l) = qαsηzγ lδ,
with q > 0 denoting neighborhood quality. We assume each household has one school-age child
and measure neighborhood quality by the quality of education in the neighborhood school. One
member of every household works for an (exogeneous) hourly wage W . Households differ in their
wages and in their preferences for school quality. We name the higher income types skilled workers
(S, earning WS) and the lower income types unskilled workers (U , earning WU < WS), and assume
that skilled workers value education more than unskilled workers do (αS > αU ).
3
3Tastes for education and incomes have been documented as strongly correlated. See Hastings et al. (2008) and
the references therein.
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The city has a dense radial transportation system, and household commuting costs increase with
distance to the CBD: if a household lives r miles away from the CBD, the cost of daily roundtrip
commuting is ar dollars (pecuniary cost, a > 0) and br hours (time cost, b > 0), which converts
to bWr dollars given the opportunity cost of time.4 We normalize the price of the composite
consumption good to one and denote the unit rent of land r miles away from the CBD by R(r).
Households pay a property tax on the value of land. Let τ denote the property tax rate as a
proportion of daily rent.5 The budget constraint of a household can be written as
z + (1 + τ)R(r)s+Wl = Y (r) ≡ 24W − (a+ bW )r. (1)
Given the market rent curves {Re(r), Rw(r)} and quality-tax packages {(qe, τe), (qw, τw)} for each
jurisdiction, type i ∈ {S,U} household solves the problem:
max
s,z,l,j∈{e,w}
U(q, s, z, l) = qαij s
ηzγ lδ (2)
s.t. z + (1 + τj)Rj(r)s+Wil = Yi(r).
2.2 Market Rent Curves and Allocation of Land
Land is owned by absentee landlords and auctioned off to the highest bidders. The reservation price
of any given landlord, Ra, is determined by an alternative use of land such as agriculture and is
independent of the location. For a given utility level u¯, we can find the maximum rent a household
is willing to pay per unit of land and optimal lot size r miles away from the CBD by solving the
problem Ψ(r, u¯, q, τ) = max
s,z,l
{
(Y (r) − z −Wl)/((1 + τ)s)
∣∣∣U(q, s, z, l) = u¯} to obtain the bid rent
function
Ψi(r, u¯, qj, τj) =
k1/η
(1 + τj)W
δ/η
i
q
αi/η
j Yi(r)
(η+γ+δ)/η u¯−1/η (3)
and the bid-max lot size function
s(r, u¯, qj, τj) =
η
(η + γ + δ)(1 + τj)
Yi(r)
Ψi(r, u¯, qj, τj)
(4)
4We ignore non-commute transportation costs and travel costs within the CBD.
5We provide details on this conversion in the calibration section below.
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where k = η
ηγγδδ
(η+γ+δ)η+γ+δ
, i ∈ {S,U}, and j ∈ {e, w}.6 At an auction for a particular location r∗,
the winner is the type with the highest bid rent curve at that location. Given the two types in the
model, in each jurisdiction there are two bid rent curves. The equilibrium rent curve Rj(r) is the
upper envelope of the bid rent curves of two types and the agricultural rent Ra. In equilibrium,
there will be a distance in each jurisdiction r∗fj , the fringe distance, beyond which no households
reside. Because all bid rent curves are convex and decreasing, the equilibrium rent curve Rj(r)
is also decreasing up to r∗jf and is constant from that point on. Households with steeper bid
rent curves locate closer to the CBD. Higher income increases the demand for land consumption
and attracts households further away from the CBD, but it also increases the opportunity cost of
commuting time.
Our city is a closed city, that is, population is given exogenously. Let L(r) represent the land
density r miles away from the CBD and nj(r) the equilibrium density function of the household
population in jurisdiction j ∈ {e, w}. Suppose that the residents of the land at distance r in
jurisdiction j are type i households in equilibrium. If the equilibrium level of utility of the type i
agent, i ∈ {S,U}, is u∗i , then nj(r) =
L(r)
s(r,u∗i ,.)
. Let N¯S , N¯U denote the populations of the respective
types. The population constraint for type i ∈ {S,U} can then be stated as
∫ ∞
0
L(r)
sw(r)
I[t∗w(r) = i]dr +
∫ ∞
0
L(r)
se(r)
I[t∗e(r) = i]dr = N¯i, (5)
where t∗j(r) is a function showing the type of the occupant at distance r in jurisdiction j, and
I[.] is an indicator function that takes the value 1 when the condition in brackets is satisfied and
0 otherwise. The population constraint implicitly assumes that the land market clears in each
jurisdiction (∀r ≤ r∗fj, sj(r)nj(r) = L(r)).
2.3 Neighborhoods
The two neighborhoods may differ in the quality of education and property tax rate (qj, τj) packages
they provide. Neighborhood schools are open to the residents of the community only. Admission is
free. Schools are financed by property taxes on residential land. The quality of education q(Π, E)
in a neighborhood is determined by (per-student) instructional expenditures E and peer quality
6For derivations and a detailed discussion of the properties of these bid-rent functions ,see Hanushek and Yilmaz
(2007).
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Π. For a given group of students, an increase in instructional expenditures increases the quality of
education (∂q/∂E ≥ 0). Given the equilibrium rent function Rj(r) and equilibrium tax rate τj , we
can calculate the tax base and total tax revenues to find the per-student expenditure in the public
school system j ∈ {e, w}:
Ej =
1
Nj
τj
∫ r∗fj
0
Rj(r)L(r)dr, (6)
where Nj denotes the number of students in neighborhood j.
Different groups of students may benefit differently from a given amount of instructional expen-
ditures. This is captured by the peer quality component Π in our model (∂q/∂Π ≥ 0). Having
high-achieving peers may matter in different ways: the students may learn directly from their
peers, they may be motivated by the competition, or the teacher may teach at a higher level or
at a more demanding pace. Because a student’s characteristics are correlated with those of her
parents, achievement at school would be correlated with the background variables of peers.7 We
assume that Π increases with the proportion of skilled households in the neighborhood and use the
following tractable formulation:8
Π = c0 + c1 exp
(
−c2
NU
NS
)
, c0, c1, c2 ≥ 0. (7)
We adopt the specification qj = q(Πj , Ej) = ΠjEj for the school quality.
The timing of events is as follows: at the beginning of each period, households make residential
choice decisions, expecting the previous period’s quality-tax rate packages to prevail. They move
in and vote for the tax rate. For a type i household, the most preferred tax rate τ∗i =
αi
η−αi
is the
solution to the indirect utility maximization problem9
τ∗i = argmax
τ
V (.) =
k
(1 + τj)ηR(r)ηW
δ
i
qαij Yi(r)
η+γ+δ (8)
for qj = ΠjEj and Ej = τjR¯j . The households are myopic when voting; they do not consider
the implications of their votes on migration patterns and the composition of neighborhoods. The
7See Sacerdote (2011) for a long list of studies that document significant effects of peer background on a student’s
own test scores in elementary and secondary schools.
8Alternative specifications give similar results. See, for example, Hanushek and Yilmaz (2007, 2012) and Hanushek,
Sarpc¸a, and Yilmaz (2011).
9The indirect utility function V (.) is decreasing in the property tax rate τ while increasing in q, a function of τ .
When η > α the preferences of a household are single-peaked. This ensures the existence of a voting equilibrium.
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quality tax rate package may be different from what they expected; however, they are stuck until
the beginning of the next period. Then they update their expectations, and the events start over
again. We study the stationary equilibrium, which is attained when no one has an incentive to
relocate in response to the voting results.
Definition: an equilibrium is a set of utility levels {u∗S , u
∗
U}, market rent curves {Re(r), Rw(r)},
quality of education and property tax rate pairs {(qe, τe), (qw, τw)}, household population distribu-
tion functions {ne(r), nw(r)}, and location-type functions {t
∗
e(r), t
∗
w(r)} that show the equilibrium
occupant of the location at distance r in community j such that:
• households’ choices are determined by solving (2);
• the market rent function Rj(r) in each jurisdiction is determined through a bidding process among
different types of households;
• same types of households obtain the same level of utility regardless of their choices;
• the tax rates in each jurisdiction are determined by majority voting by myopic voters;
• local governments’ budgets balance in each jurisdiction, (6);
• labor and land markets clear;
• and the population constraints (5) hold.
2.4 Calibration
The equilibrium of our model can only be calculated numerically.10 We specify parameter values
to match certain statistics from mid-size U.S. cities in 2005. Normalizing the sum η + γ + δ to 1,
the solution to the household problem gives the optimal budget shares for leisure, consumption,
and lot size as δ, γ, and η, respectively. In the U.S., the average number of hours of work per
week in full-time jobs is 40, and the average annual earnings of workers are $30,104 for high school
graduates and $58,114 for college graduates.11 Accordingly, we set the hourly wages for unskilled
and skilled households as WU = 14 and WS = 27. In a 168 (= 24 ∗ 7) hour week, 40 hours of work
implies a 0.762 budget share for leisure, so the budget share of non-leisure (actual expenditures) is
(1-0.762).12 The data on household expenditures suggest that expenditures on shelter constitute
10The algorithm that is used for solving the models in this paper is available in the web appendix.
11U.S. Statistical Abstract.
12We assume that people sell all of their hours and buy back leisure at the wage rate.
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about 20% of the budget of an average household.13 This implies budget shares of 4.76% (=(1-
0.762)*20%) for housing and 19% for consumption. We chose the most desired property tax rates
for the two household types as 1.97% (for high valuation) and 1.04% (for low valuation)—slightly
higher/lower than the U.S. average of 1.40%—and calibrate the α’s accordingly.14 The average
population density in a city with a population of 1 to 2.5 million is about 4.53 people per acre.15
This defines an endogenous calibration target that is achieved by setting agricultural rent Ra = $731
per acre per month. The utility function parameters consistent with all of these are αL = 0.014,
αH = 0.021, δ = 0.762, and γ = 0.19.
16
(Table 1 about here)
We calculate the commuting costs assuming that households drive to work. The pecuniary cost can
be calculated based on the cost of owning and operating an automobile. In 2004, the pecuniary
cost per mile was $0.56, and we set a = 1.1. Assuming the commuting speed in the city is 20 miles
per hour, we set b = 0.13. We assume 1.5 million households populate the city. When computing
the equilibrium, we target for a (endogenous) fringe distance (city radius) approximately 15 miles
in each jurisdiction. The proportion of college graduates in the U.S. is about 30%. We expect this
proportion to be slightly higher in a city. Hence, we set the proportion of skilled households to 40%.
We choose the parameters of the school quality function to c0 = 0.1, c1 = 1.3677 and c2 = 0.05743
to match certain endogenous calibration targets to their estimates in the empirical literature.
13Using data from U.S. Statistical Abstract, the share of shelter in total expenditures can be calculated as 21%
for households with incomes less than $70K, 19.6% for those with incomes between $70K–80K, 19% for those with
incomes between $80K–100K, and 19.5% for those with incomes $100K and over. With just two income levels in the
model, the calibration of budget shares is consistent with these figures.
14We conducted an additional analysis to check the robustness of our results to changes in the levels of αi’s and
τ∗i ’s. The levels we select for αi’s affect the most desired tax rates of skilled and unskilled households by about ±20%
or more. This analysis shows that our welfare comparisons are robust to such changes in property tax rates and
utility parameters. We report the results from this additional analysis in the web appendix.
15U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates Files.
16Property taxes are paid over property value (the present value of the perpetual rent stream), whereas the model
is written for a day. The conversion can be done as follows: the total annual rent is 365*R*s , and the property
taxes paid in a year amount to τ*365*R*s. With an annual interest rate i, the property value (the present value of
the perpetual rent stream) is (365*R*s)/i. The annual property tax rates given above are calculated as the ratio of
annual tax paid τ*365*R*S to the property value, i.e., τ*i for i = 0.0253.
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2.5 Baseline Equilibrium
Figure 1 displays a map of the city and Table 2 summarizes some properties of equilibrium. Several
observations are immediate: (1) neighborhoods are heterogeneous, both household types exist in
each neighborhood; (2) there is (partial) Tiebout sorting across neighborhoods;17 and (3) there is
income-sorting with respect to distance within neighborhoods: Unskilled households choose smaller
lots closer to the CBD, whereas skilled households live on larger lots away from the CBD.
(Figure 1, Table 2 about here)
The results are intuitive. Costly commuting causes the market rents in each jurisdiction to decrease
in distance to the CBD. Higher income increases the land demand and attracts households further
away from the CBD, where the land is cheaper. High income also increases the opportunity cost of
commuting time, but our calibration suggests that this effect is dominated by the former, consistent
with residential patterns in the U.S. As a result, in each community unskilled households occupy
a semicircle around the CBD. The skilled households reside in a semi-ring that surrounds the
semicircle of unskilled households. The outer end of the skilled households’ semi-ring is the fringe
distance, the land beyond which is left for agricultural use.18 The intuition behind heterogenous
communities is also straightforward: households choose the lot size, distance to the CBD, and the
community (with a given quality of education and a property tax rate) simultaneously. Hence,
lower taxes or lower rents in a community (hence larger lots) can compensate for lower quality of
education and vice versa.
Notice that about 70% of skilled households live in the same neighborhood, constituting a 55%
majority of the population there. As a result, the voting outcome is the higher tax rate. Without
loss of generality, we refer to the higher tax neighborhood as the west school district throughout
the paper. Because the two neighborhoods have comparable populations, higher taxes and rents
mean higher educational expenditures per student in the west ($3, 653 vs $2, 027). Also, the peer
17The first two observations highlight an advantage of our approach over Tiebout frameworks that do not consider
accessibility: the partial sorting across heterogeneous communities is consistent with empirical findings on household
sorting (e.g., Davidoff, 2005).
18The “ring” structure, dating back to von Thunen’s model of land use (1826), is replaced by semi-rings here
because of the jurisdiction boundaries that identify the differing bundles of the local public good. In general, the
widths of rings may differ between neighborhoods. The ordering of households around the CBD, however, is the same
in each district.
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quality is higher in the west neighborhood; thus the quality of education exceeds that in the east.19
This difference in the quality of education is capitalized into rents; rents in the west are about 25%
higher on average than those in the east.
3 Public Housing
We study two housing aid policies in this and the following sections: government-provided sub-
sidized units and housing vouchers. These programs are financed by uniform income taxes on
earnings of all households regardless of their location (and participant contributions in the case of
public housing units). Only unskilled households are eligible. The government sets the maximum
number of participants NP exogenously. If the number of program applicants exceeds NP , partici-
pants are selected by a lottery.20 Table 3 summarizes the main differences between the two policies
we consider.
(Table 3 about here)
3.1 Public Housing Model
The government announces that public housing units will be located between rP and rP +wP miles
from the CBD in one of the neighborhoods.21 All unskilled households that consider this to be in
their interest apply, and a lottery selects NP participants in the case of excess demand. The rents
19The higher tax/expenditure community providing a higher quality of education with higher per-student-
expenditure may mislead one to overemphasize the role of expenditures on school quality. Hanushek, Sarpc¸a, and
Yilmaz (2011) show that the existence of a private sector for education breaks the link between expenditures and
school quality.
20Rationing is an important feature of housing aid policies in the U.S. Downs (1991) states “Congress has never
provided enough funds for vouchers to make them entitlements, so they must be rationed to a fraction of all eligible
households.” Using a panel data set collected by the Housing Authority of the City of Pittsburgh, Epple et al. (2009)
estimate that for each family that leaves public housing there are about four families that would like to move into
the vacated unit.
21It is possible to build public housing in both neighborhoods, such as a full-ring on the map, and guarantee certain
outcomes such as desegregation exogenously. In the equilibrium of such a model, we would obtain results similar to the
baseline equilibrium, with weaker sorting and a smaller gap in the quality of education across jurisdictions. Typically,
however, public housing is not built in the best neighborhoods, because of both costs and political reasons. Moreover,
building public housing in a neighborhood is likely to cause some residents to relocate, altering the composition and
the desirability of the neighborhood. Therefore, keeping one of the neighborhoods free from public housing gives us a
chance to observe the interesting effects of such a program on its hosting neighborhood, resulting inbound-outbound
migration, and the effects of this migration on neighborhood composition/characteristics as well as on local public
good provision in both hosting and neighboring localities.
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are determined by the same auction process as described above, with bidders excluding the NP
program participants and including the government. For any location in the public housing band,
the government pays the maximum rent that households would have been willing to pay, had this
land been available to them. This land is then divided into lots with equal size sP and allocated to
NP participants with subsidized rents. A program participant household pays a fixed price RP as
its program contribution. Denote the income tax rate by θ. This policy reduces a public housing
resident’s problem to leisure-consumption choice only:
max
z,l
UP (qe, sP , z, l) = q
αU
e s
η
P z
γ lδ s.t. (9)
z +RP + (1− θ)WU l = YP (r) = 24(1 − θ)WU − (a+ b(1 − θ)WU )r,
whereas other households of type i ∈ {S,U} solve the original problem (2) in the presence of income
taxes:
max
s,z,l,j∈{e,w}
U(q, s, z, l) = qαij s
ηzγlδ s.t. (10)
z + (1 + τj)Rj(r)s+ (1− θ)Wil = Yi(r) = 24(1 − θ)Wi − (a+ b(1− θ)Wi)r,
taking rents and neighborhood quality-tax pairs as given.22
The cost of public housing is financed by income tax revenues and participant contributions, and
equals the sum of rents and any payments to the local government. Public housing units are
exempt from property taxes; a payment—known as Payment in Lieu of Tax, or PILOT—is made
to compensate the local government in the east for some of the property tax revenue that it loses,
in recognition of the services it provides to public housing residents.23 The time constraint of
a household gives the labor supply as all of the time except leisure and commute time: n =
24 − l − br. The solution to (10) gives the optimal leisure of a household residing at distance r as
22An incentive problem arises when public housing residents do not pay property taxes, as their most preferred tax
rate would be 100% when voting. Even though the equilibrium described in the next section is not affected by this,
there may be some alternative specifications that may result in different types of equilibria depending on whether
public housing residents are allowed to vote or not. For consistency, we assume that public housing residents vote for
the same tax rate as other unskilled households.
23Given that public housing complexes are built/subsidized with public money (and that their rent incomes are
lower and their expenses are higher than similar for-profit buildings) it may be counterproductive to tax them the
same as other rental properties. A survey on tax exemption and tax assessment policies related to affordable housing
complexes and PILOTs in the U.S. found that over 60% of states authorize localities to exempt affordable housing
complexes from local property taxes (Lunney, 2009).
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l∗i (r) = δ
Yi(r)
(1−θ)Wi
for i ∈ {S,U}. For a household that lives in public housing, optimal leisure is
l∗P (r) =
δ
δ+γ
YP (r)−RP
(1−θ)WU
. We can define a t∗j(r) function that shows the type of occupant at distance r
in jurisdiction j (whether skilled, unskilled, or in public housing). Let I[.] be an indicator function
that takes the value 1 when the condition in brackets is satisfied and 0 otherwise. The public
housing program budget constraint is:
∫ rP+wP
rP
Re(r)L(r)dr + PILOT =θ
∑
j∈{e,w}
[∫ r∗fj
0
L(r)
sj(r)
( ∑
i∈{S,U,P}
I[t∗j(r) = i](24 − l
∗
i (r)− br)Wi
)
dr
]
+NPRP . (11)
The LHS adds up the total rent cost of the public housing band and the payment to the local
government, the choice of which we discuss below. Consider the first term on the RHS: the inside
summation identifies which household type resides at a particular location and calculates their
labor income in equilibrium. The integral calculates the total labor income using the household
density at that location. The outside summation adds the labor income of two communities. A
fraction θ of this gives us the income tax revenues. The second term on the RHS is the sum of
participant contributions. Equilibrium now also requires program budget constraint (11) holds.
3.2 Equilibrium
We first study a model in which the government provides public housing units on the land that
is between 4 and 6 miles away from the CBD in the east neighborhood. This causes most skilled
households to reside in the west, which then becomes the higher rent/tax/school quality neighbor-
hood.24 In the baseline equilibrium unskilled households lived in this band in the east, and the lot
sizes ranged from 0.109 to 0.154 acres (at 4 and 6 miles away from the CBD) with an average lot
size of 0.128 acres. The average monthly rent was $3,520 per acre. A public housing unit measures
0.160 acres now. This is about 25% larger than the average unit within that band in the baseline
equilibrium. This band accommodates about 15% of all unskilled households. We exogenously
set the income tax rate at 0.57% to match the endogenous calibration target for the participant
contribution for public housing of $339 so that the utility increase from public housing is equivalent
24The choice of neighborhood does not matter. Knowing where public housing units will locate, households ad-
just their bids and sort accordingly, and the neighborhood with public housing becomes the lower-tax/quality/rent
neighborhood.
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to that from a 10% income subsidy in equilibrium and (11) holds.
In practice, the basis for deciding upon an appropriate PILOT amount varies across municipalities.
One of the recommendations in Lunney (2009) is to “lower the property value on which the tax rate
is assessed by basing the assessment on actual income and expenses rather than on potential market
rate figures.” A typical public housing complex would have a lower rent income and higher operating
costs than a comparable private rental complex. Kenyon and Langley (2010) report that “Some
(municipalities) ask tax-exempt institutions to pay a specific proportion of the property taxes the
institution would owe if taxable. (...) in many cases PILOTs are completely ad hoc and negotiated
without any apparent basis.” These and other resources suggest that property taxes collected over
total rent income of the public housing program (PILOT = τeNPRP ) would be an appropriate
choice. With our calibration, this corresponds to 42% of the property taxes that would be owed in
equilibrium if the public housing band was fully taxable (for example, the city of Boston seeks 25%,
Kenyon and Langley, 2010). Bowman, et al. (2009) estimate that the state-level foregone property
tax revenues because of PILOTs range between 1.5% to 10% of property tax revenues, and the
national average is around 5%. Our specification implies a 3.42% loss. Choosing a smaller PILOT
would make public housing residents even less desirable neighbors, strengthening our arguments
against public housing that will follow. (We comment on the implications of choice of a larger
PILOT in the conclusion.)
We present the welfare effects of this policy in the first row of Table 4. Our welfare measure is the
change in rents necessary to provide households with their utility level in baseline equilibrium. A
negative number indicates that the household type is worse off, because rents need to be decreased
to make those households indifferent to the baseline allocation. As a measure of the change in
overall welfare, we calculate the change in rents necessary to keep aggregate utility at the baseline
equilibrium level and present it in column 4 (AU). Public housing residents are better off, whereas
all other households are worse off compared to baseline equilibrium; overall welfare (as measured
by AU) is lower.
(Table 4 about here)
Table 5 presents some properties of the new equilibrium, and Figure 2 displays a map of the city.
Sorting is stronger compared to that under baseline equilibrium: 75% of skilled households live in
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the west (up from 69% in baseline) and constitute the majority there.
(Figure 2, Table 5 about here)
Rents are higher than those in the baseline equilibrium in both neighborhoods. The intuition
is straightforward: the public housing policy removes a substantial amount of would-be-inhabited
land from the private market. The non-recipients, who are either the skilled or the less fortunate
unskilled workers, compete for the remaining land. However: 1. the average income of these
households—which affects their willingness to pay for land—that compete in the private market is
higher than before (because the households who left the private market are exclusively unskilled);
and 2. the amount of accessible land is less than before (because public housing took out more
land from the market than its residents would obtain on their own, if they had a choice). As a
result, other things being equal, one would expect to see higher rents in equilibrium. However,
other things are not equal, as there is also a fiscal burden issue: the property tax revenues from
the public housing band are less than what would be collected from the same area without tax
exemptions. This makes public housing residents undesirable neighbors, and the magnitude of this
problem increases in the gap between the property tax revenues at market rents and the PILOT.
For skilled households (with stronger preferences for education), the west is now a better option
than before: the marginal effects of a tax dollar on per-student expenditures are higher. As a result,
sorting is stronger, and the difference in quality of education is higher between two neighborhoods
compared with the baseline equilibrium, as both the spending and the peer quality in the west
(east) are higher (lower) than before. The computed equilibrium quantifies the described effects.
We also observe that the public housing residents decrease their labor supply by about 6.5% on
average to 38.6 hours per week, down from 41.3 hours in baseline equilibrium. This is a result of
two effects: 1. income taxes decrease the relative price of leisure; and 2. rent subsidy expands the
budget set for leisure and consumption, but not for housing, resulting in a disproportionate increase
in the consumption of the first two. Additional analysis confirms the presence of such a strong effect
under several alternative formulations.25 These findings are consistent with the empirical findings
on housing aid policies and labor supply.26
25Results from the additional analysis are available in the web appendix.
26Clearly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to review this literature. Among others, see Bingley and Walker
(2001), Hulse and Randolph (2005), Olsen et al (2005), and the references therein.
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The Size of a Public Housing Unit
In the analysis presented above, a public housing unit is 25% larger compared with the average
unit that was on the band now occupied by public housing units in the baseline equilibrium. Our
results regarding welfare, however, are not driven by this particular choice of size. Note that if
they were given a choice, public housing residents would now choose a lot that is slightly larger
than their choices in the baseline equilibrium because of the income effect of the subsidy. A further
increase in the size of public housing units, however, may hurt the public housing residents, as the
net cost (subsidized rent) has to increase with the size for the program budget to hold: first, the
lots are larger, and second, the overall level of rents is higher because the removal of accessible
land from the private market is more excessive than before. Note that although the population
density decreases in the east with larger public housing units, the property tax loss becomes a larger
concern, as it applies to a larger area in the neighborhood. (We would see the opposite effects with
smaller units.)
Within-district Location of Public Housing Units
In the analysis presented above, the public housing units are provided 4 miles away from the CBD.
At that location, a public housing unit is 25% larger than a typical lot at the same location in the
baseline model (and is close in size to what the public housing residents would obtain on their own
with the income effect of the subsidy). We utilize the spatial features of our model by comparing the
welfare outcomes with public housing units provided at different locations. To isolate the effects of
location, we now keep the sizes and the number of subsidized units—hence the total area occupied
by public housing—the same while varying the distance of the public housing band to the CBD.
If moved closer to the CBD, the (same-size) public housing unit becomes larger compared with a
typical lot around that location. Although the commuting costs decrease for the public housing
residents, their rents are higher closer to the CBD, and the subsidy covers a smaller share of this
higher rent. Public housing also replaces a larger number of households that would occupy the
same area without public housing. This has two implications: first, property-tax loss in the east
increases (because the market rents are higher when closer to the CBD, but PILOT is proportional
to subsidized rents); and second, the number of households competing for land in the private market
increases, as public housing replaces smaller lots (more households) when closer to the CBD. (We
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would observe the opposite effects as the public housing units are moved away from the CBD.)
Welfare Comparisons
How welfare is affected by changes in the size and location of public housing units depends on
the relative magnitudes of the effects described above, the associated implications on the sorting
of households in response, and the resulting levels and differentials of rents, tax rates, and school
qualities in equilibrium.
Rows 2 to 6 of Table 4 summarize the welfare changes associated with the size of a public housing
unit ranging from 25% smaller (–25%) to 75% larger (+75%) compared with the average unit on
the area occupied by public housing band in the baseline equilibrium. The last column shows that
overall welfare decreases as we move away from our initial choice of 25% larger in either direction.
Varying the lot size between –25% and +25% seems to have only a small effect on public housing
residents’ welfare, but increases beyond +25% make the public housing residents significantly worse
off as: 1. they would be forced to obtain lots that are too large compared to their optimal choice
under this income effect; 2. holding total government subsidies and the number of public housing
residents constant, the share of subsidies in this forced lot-size consumption would be too small.
Rows 7 to 10 of Table 4 summarize the welfare effects when public housing units are provided at 0,
2, and 6 miles away from the CBD. We find that the welfare of public housing residents increases
as public housing units are provided further away from the CBD, suggesting that the decrease in
the net cost of the land outweighs the increase in commuting costs.
A deviation from our initial choice of +25% or from our initial choice of four miles in either direction
hurts households outside of public housing, because of the changes in the magnitude of the fiscal
burden problem (arising from changes in the amount of property-tax loss and population density)
and the implied general equilibrium effects described above.
In each of the cases we have studied, the total utility gain of public housing residents is smaller
than the total utility loss of the rest of the population, so the change in overall welfare (as measured
by AU) is negative.
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4 Housing Vouchers
4.1 Voucher Model
Instead of providing physical units with subsidized rents, the government can simply redistribute
the income tax revenues to low-income households in the form of housing vouchers. In this scenario,
each of the NP program participants obtains a voucher towards rent with the amount νP . For the
government budget to balance, income tax revenues must equal the total amount of these vouchers:
NP νP = θ
∑
j∈{e,w}
[∫ r∗fj
0
L(r)
sj(r)
( ∑
i∈{S,U,P}
I[t∗j (r) = i](24 − l
∗
i (r)− br)Wi
)
dr
]
(12)
A household’s problem is the same as the one in (10), but a voucher recipient’s housing expenditures
are those exceeding νP only. This is equivalent to creating a third household type with the same
preferences as unskilled households, but with the kinked budget constraint
z +max{0, (1 + τj)Rj(r)s− νP }+WU l = YP (r) = 24(1 − θ)WU − (a+ b(1− θ)WU )r. (13)
Because household utility increases in lot size, no household will spend less on housing than the
voucher amount. Whether the household will spend more depends on the voucher amount and some
model parameters. The leisure choice of a voucher recipient is l∗P (r) = δ
YP (r)+νP
(1−θ)WU
if the household
spends greater than the voucher amount, and l∗P (r) =
δ
γ+δ
YP (r)
(1−θ)WU
otherwise. The land is allocated
according to the competitive auction mechanism described in Section 2. An additional equilibrium
condition is that the program budget (12) holds.
4.2 Equilibrium
For comparison, we keep the (number of) recipients and the tax rate the same as the public housing
policy; this implies a housing voucher worth $227 per month.27 Figure 3 provides a map of the city
27Rationing of housing vouchers to a fraction of eligible households is consistent with practices in the U.S. (Downs,
1991). The lottery specification has the additional benefit of keeping the program size the same as under public
housing. An alternative implementation is to provide vouchers to every household below a certain income level. With
just two income levels in the model, this means providing vouchers to all unskilled households, thus increasing the
number of program participants from 9% to 60% of the population. Holding the income tax rate constant decreases
the voucher amount to $34 per household. The findings of this exercise (available in the web appendix) are quite
similar to those in this section, so we refrain from repeating those details here.
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and Table 6 summarizes some properties of equilibrium. Vouchers shift land demand, increasing
rents in both neighborhoods. The equilibrium rents, however, are lower than those under public
housing policy, because there is no excessive removal of accessible land from the market as there is
under public housing.
Sorting of households is stronger than that under the baseline equilibrium, close to the public
housing equilibrium levels: 74% of skilled households live in the west (as opposed to 69% in baseline)
and constitute a 56% majority there. The major cause of this is the increase in land demand in the
east: all voucher recipients reside in the east (where unskilled households are a majority) because of
their weaker preferences for education. The quality of education in the west is slightly higher than
both the baseline and public housing models, because of both sorting and the higher expenditures.
A policy maker concerned with education of the poor may prefer vouchers over public housing: the
quality in the east, the poorer neighborhood, is higher than that under the public housing model.
The fiscal burden problem we described in the public housing units section is of no concern here, as
voucher recipients still pay property taxes at the market rent level. However, households without
vouchers are hurt by both the higher rents and income taxes. The equilibrium utility levels of
non-recipients (both skilled and unskilled households) are higher than those under public housing,
but lower than baseline equilibrium levels. The (average) utility level of voucher recipients falls
below that of public housing recipients. We present the change in household welfare according to
their types in the last row of Table 4. The welfare loss to non-recipients is less than that under
public housing policy, and the change in total welfare (as measured by AU) is positive.
(Figure 3, Table 6 about here)
Income taxes hurt work incentives by decreasing the relative price of leisure. The income effect of
vouchers also allows recipients to increase their leisure consumption. But voucher recipients work
more than public housing recipients (42 vs. 38.6 hours/week). This should not be puzzling: the
public housing program also creates an income effect, but by restricting households’ location-lot size
choices and their housing expenditures, it also causes a disproportionate increase in consumption
of the other two commodities available for purchase, the composite good and leisure. Housing
voucher recipients are not restricted in terms of their residential choices, they reside further away
from unskilled households, obtaining larger lots and increasing their leisure proportionally. Even
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though they work less than the typical unskilled resident living at the same distance in baseline
equilibrium—a result of the income effect caused by the voucher—they work longer hours than
they would if they received public housing instead.
4.3 A Note on Desegregation
We have discussed several reasons a housing voucher program might be preferred over a public
housing program with the same budget. Another advantage of housing vouchers over public housing
units is that the vouchers do not impose restrictions on households’ location choices. Hence, a policy
maker with concern over the patterns of household sorting across neighborhoods may be particularly
interested in how housing vouchers can influence these patterns.
The equilibrium neighborhood compositions under the two programs are, however, almost identical
in the above analysis. The west community provides a higher quality of education at the cost of
higher taxes on land consumption. The skilled households have stronger preferences (and willingness
to pay) for education compared with voucher recipients, so they outbid the voucher recipients on the
west land away from the CBD. However, unskilled households without vouchers value proximity to
the CBD and outbid voucher recipients on the west land close to the CBD. The unskilled households
demand smaller lots than voucher recipients and therefore are not as affected by larger taxes as
much as voucher recipients who demand relatively larger lots. As a result, voucher recipients are
not observed residing in the west. We have also mentioned that increasing the number of voucher
recipients without changing the income tax rates resulted in a similar equilibrium.
We conducted an additional analysis with alternative parameterizations that may allow us to ob-
serve voucher recipients in the west. Increasing tax rates while keeping the number of recipients
the same did not cause enough increase in the bids of voucher recipients in the west. We have
observed, however, that it is possible to induce voucher recipients residing in the west with both
a larger program size and a larger income tax rate, increasing the voucher recipients’ land bids in
both neighborhoods and allowing them to outbid some households in the west. We present the
spatial distribution of households in the equilibrium of one such model in Figure 4, in which 25% of
unskilled households receive housing vouchers for $537 per month. This program is financed by an
income tax rate of 1.5%. In the equilibrium of this model, about one fifth of the voucher recipients
live in the west, occupying a narrow semi-ring between the unskilled households’ semicircle around
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the CBD and the skilled households’ semi-ring. Other aspects of the equilibria remain qualitatively
the same for our purposes, so we refrain from a detailed discussion here.28
(Figure 4 about here)
5 Concluding Remarks
Green and Malpezzi (2003) survey a vast literature on the housing market and housing policies in the
U.S., and argue that “Most economists like vouchers because they are generally more efficient than
other programs. (...) But in the United States, political support is generally stronger for programs
tied more closely to the consumption of specific goods (housing, food, and medical care) than for
income support.” This paper attempts to contribute to this related debate. In particular, this
paper explicitly highlights the importance of the location of public housing to equilibrium outcomes
such as rents, neighborhood compositions, educational opportunities, labor supply decisions, and
social welfare. We explain the channels through which such location effects work. Using a rich
general equilibrium model that combines land use theory with a Tiebout framework, we provide
a comparison of public housing and housing voucher policies, and conclude that vouchers not
only cause less distortion for social welfare compared with public housing, but they also improve
overall welfare. The difference between the two policies is mainly driven by the implications of: 1.
property-tax losses of the neighborhood under public housing; and 2. the forced location and lot
size choices under public housing. Therefore, even if the fiscal burden problem of public housing is
solved (e.g., with higher PILOTs), vouchers may still be preferred because of the freedom of choice
in location and lot sizes. The results of our analysis are consistent with the findings from previous
studies that compare in-kind versus in-cash welfare programs, verifying their validity in a richer
framework with accessibility, local public goods, and peer group externalities.
We also find that public housing policies tends to discourage the labor supply, especially for the
unskilled workers who reside in public housing, as some empirical literature has suggested. Voucher
recipients work the same hours as they did before the vouchers. This seems to strengthen the
in-cash rather than in-kind arguments even further. Additional analysis (the results of which are
available in the web appendix) reveals that our findings are robust to changes in the levels for utility
28Detailed results are available from the authors.
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parameters (which determine most desired property tax rates) as well as to the incorporation of a
housing industry.29
In many countries, central governments contribute to the financing of local public goods and services
in differing extents. If the share of local financing decreases in our model, the sorting would be
weaker, as it becomes less effective on the local provision level. An implication is that unskilled
households constitute the majority in both neighborhoods above a certain share of central financing.
In that case, the voting outcome would be the lower tax rate in both neighborhoods, and the quality
difference between the neighborhoods would be less. Another implication is that desegregation could
be obtained more easily with vouchers than as presented in this paper. Future work will investigate
these issues in detail.
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Table 1: Calibration Parameters
δ 0.762
γ 0.19
η 0.048
WU 14
WS 27
αL 0.014
αH 0.021
a 1.1
b 0.13
c0 0.1
c1 1.3677
c2 0.0574
NS/(NS +NU ) 0.40
Table 2: Baseline Equilibrium
West East
Average Monthly Rent (per Acre) $2729 $2194
Average Rent in S area $2204 $1433
Average Rent in U area $5416 $3368
Average Lot Size S (Acres) 0.791 1.209
Average Lot Size U 0.173 0.275
Property Tax Rate 1.97% 1.04%
School Quality 14 7
Distribution of Households Across Neighborhoods
S 69% 31%
U 42% 58%
Neighborhood Population Breakdown
S 53% 26%
U 47% 74%
Table 3: Housing Aid Policies
Public Housing Units Housing Vouchers
Location & Lot size Choice By policy-maker By voucher recipients
Rent Paid Fixed, below market rent Reduced by voucher amount
Property Taxes Households do not pay property
taxes, the program makes a pay-
ment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) to
the local government
Same as without voucher
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Table 4: Welfare
S U P AU
Public Housing -5.64 -5.39 85.67 -0.35
-25% -9.24 -5.71 81.16 -2.41
0 -9.28 -6.45 86.63 -2.57
Size of Public Housing +25% -5.64 -5.39 85.67 -0.35
+50% -9.55 -8.04 63.51 -4.49
+75% -9.72 -8.81 44.80 -5.87
0-4.47 miles -9.83 -9.20 33.53 -6.71
2-4.90 miles -9.61 -8.41 52.72 -5.23
Location of Public Housing 4-6.00 miles -5.64 -5.39 85.67 -0.35
6-7.48 miles -9.29 -6.20 88.37 -2.37
Vouchers -3.29 -3.31 59.01 0.54
Table 5: Public Housing
Income Tax Rate: 0.57%
West East
Average Monthly Rent (per Acre) $2764 $1955
Average Lot Size S (Acres) 0.770 1.261
Average Lot Size U 0.165 0.301
Average Lot Size P - 0.320
Property Tax Rate 1.97% 1.04%
School Quality 14.15 6.02
Distribution of Households Across Neighborhoods
S 75% 25%
U 41% 59%
(14% P)
Neighborhood Population Breakdown
S 55% 22%
U 45% 78%
(19% P)
25
Table 6: Housing Vouchers
Income Tax Rate: 0.57%
West East
Average Monthly Rent (per Acre) $2741 $2186
Average Lot Size S (Acres) 0.771 1.246
Average Lot Size U 0.166 0.247
Average Lot Size V - 0.423
Property Tax Rate 1.97% 1.04%
School Quality 14.25 6.56
Distribution of Households Across Neighborhoods
S 74% 26%
U 39% 61%
(14% V)
Neighborhood Population Breakdown
S 56% 22%
U 44% 78%
(18% V)
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CBD
8.47 mi.
U
5.02 mi.
S
5.68 mi.
U
8.33 mi.
S
West East
Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Households in the Baseline Equilibrium. The outer semi-rings (marked
by S) are the areas in which skilled households reside. The inner semicircles (marked by U) are the areas in
which unskilled households reside.
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CBD
8.95 mi.
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Figure 2: Spatial Distribution of Households in the Public Housing Equilibrium. The outer semi-rings
(marked by S) are the areas in which skilled households reside. The inner semicircles (marked by U) are
the areas in which unskilled households reside. The shaded semi-ring is the public housing band between 4
and 6 miles from CBD.
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Figure 3: Spatial Distribution of Households in the Vouchers Equilibrium. The outer semi-rings (marked
by S) are the areas in which skilled households reside. The inner semicircles (marked by U) are the areas in
which unskilled households reside. The shaded semi-ring is the area in which voucher recipients reside.
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Figure 4: Map of an equilibrium with voucher recipients residing in both neighborhoods.
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A.1 Robustness and Extensions
A.1.1 Utility Parameters and Tax Rates
The most desired property tax rates for the two household types are chosen to be slightly higher/lower
than the U.S. average of 1.40%, and the utility parameters αH and αL are calibrated according to
equation (8) in the paper. We conduct an additional analysis with alternative specifications for the
levels of αi’s, which affect desired tax rates by about ±20% or more. Table A.1 reports representa-
tive results results from these alternative specifications along with the original specification given in
the middle row of each panel. An inspection of the columns reporting the changes in overall welfare
(AU) under two policies shows our findings are robust to such changes in property tax rates.
Table A.1: Welfare II - Property Tax Rates
Public Housing Vouchers
(αH , αL; τ∗H , τ
∗
L) S U P AU S U P AU
(.018, .014; 1.52, 1.04) -4.85 -5.18 81.74 -0.34 -2.93 -2.72 59.42 1.03
(.021, .014; 1.97, 1.04) -5.64 -5.39 85.67 -0.35 -3.29 -3.31 59.01 0.54
(.024, .014; 2.54, 1.04) -5.26 -5.20 82.04 -0.25 -3.01 -2.72 59.42 0.97
(.021, .012; 1.97, 0.84) -4.89 -4.90 76.36 -0.17 -2.99 -2.73 59.50 0.99
(.021, .014; 1.97, 1.04) -5.64 -5.39 85.67 -0.35 -3.29 -3.31 59.01 0.54
(.021, .016; 1.97, 1.26) -5.20 -5.49 88.16 -0.08 -3.00 -2.78 59.23 0.96
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A.1.2 Labor Supply
One of our findings is that households decrease their labor supply when provided with public
housing units. In this section we provide representative results from additional analysis in which
we vary: 1. The sizes of public housing units; 2. The location of the public housing units; 3. Utility
(and tax rate) parameters. Table A.2 summarizes average working hours per week, comparing the
labor supply of public housing residents and housing voucher recipients to labor supply of the
households that live on the public housing location in benchmark equilibrium.1 One row in each
panel (+25%, 2-4.90, and (.014, .021), in bold) represents the original model for reference. Public
housing recipients work less than voucher recipients (The only exception arises when public housing
is built at the CBD and a public housing resident’s travel cost becomes zero).
Table A.2: Average Weekly Labor Supply
of Housing Aid Participants (hours/week)
Benchmark Public Housing Housing Vouchers
Size
-25% 41.2 35.6 42.0
0 41.2 37.3 42.0
+25% 41.3 38.6 42.0
+50% 41.3 40.6 42.0
+75% 41.3 42.3 42.0
Location
0-4.47 40.7 42.5 42.0
2-4.90 40.9 41.1 42.0
4-6.00 41.3 38.6 42.0
6-7.48 41.7 37.2 42.0
(αL, αH)
(.012,.021) 41.3 39.1 41.7
(.014,.018) 41.3 39.0 41.7
(.014,.021) 41.3 38.6 42.0
(.014,.024) 41.3 38.9 41.7
(.016,.021) 41.3 38.8 41.7
1The band occupied by public housing hosted unskilled households in benchmark equilibrium; see Figure 1.
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A.1.3 Vouchers for All Unskilled Households
Rationing of housing vouchers to a fraction of eligible households is consistent with the practices
in the U.S. (Downs, 1991). The lottery specification in the paper has the additional benefit of
keeping the program size the same as under public housing. An alternative implementation is to
provide vouchers to every household below a certain income level. With just two income levels
in the model, this means providing vouchers to all unskilled households, increasing the number
of program participants from 9% to 60% of the population. Holding income tax rate constant
decreases the voucher amount to $34 per household. The findings of this exercise given in Table
A.3 are quite similar to those of the lottery specification in the paper.
Table A.3: Housing Vouchers II
(Every Unskilled Household Gets Vouchers)
Income Tax Rate: 0.57%
West East
Average Monthly Rent (per Acre) $2727 $2192
Property Tax Rate 1.97% 1.04%
School Quality 13.96 6.93
Distribution of Households Across Neighborhoods
S 70% 30%
U 41% 59%
Neighborhood Population Breakdown
S 53% 26%
U 47% 74%
A.1.4 Housing Industry
Our framework is based on Alonso’s model (1964) which assumes that each household manages
the construction of its house by itself. An alternative approach is Muth’s model (1969) in which
households derive utility from consuming housing space H, produced by competitive firms using Λ
units of land and K units of capital with the production function:
H = AKaΛ1−a (1)
for a ∈ (0, 1) and A > 0. Then as land gets more expensive closer to the CBD, the share of capital
to land in the construction of housing space increases, i.e., taller/multi-unit buildings are observed.
We incorporate this housing industry to our framework, and repeat the analysis presented so
far in this paper. This change in the formulation does not alter our qualitative findings regarding
welfare comparisons, while adding considerable complexity to the analysis. We solve the equilibrium
without government intervention (benchmark), with public housing, and with housing vouchers.
We calibrate the parameters of the housing production function so that the ratio of housing space
to land is about 16 near the CBD and 1 near fringe in the benchmark model.2
2These can be interpreted as the number of floors of buildings, but one should also keep in mind that it is a
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We initially locate the public housing units at 4 miles away from the CBD, keeping the ratio of
housing space to land at the benchmark level at this distance (about 4). We set the public housing
unit size same as the average unit in the same area in benchmark. We have also solved alternative
models with: 1. The public housing unit size 25% smaller and 25% larger than the average unit
in the same area in benchmark; 2. The ratio of housing space to land is 3 and 5; 3. The location
of public housing units at 3 and 5 miles away from the CBD. We summarize results from this
analysis in Table 7 below. The middle rows in top three panels (titled as “same,” “4,” “4 miles”)
represent the main public housing model, and the very bottom row in the table presents the welfare
implications of the voucher model with housing industry.
An inspection of Table A.4 reveals that housing vouchers are preferable to public housing units in
this extended model too. We also solve this extended model with alternative utility-tax parameters.
Table A.5 presents the counterpart to Table A.1 with housing industry.
In the first and last rows of the table, where the utility parameters of the two types get close to
each other, the overall welfare under public housing is slightly greater than that under vouchers.
However, a closer inspection of the Table reveals that households that do not participate in the
program still prefer housing vouchers to public housing units. The higher overall welfare results
from the large difference from program participants’ utility levels.
Table A.4: Models with Housing Industry I - Size, Share of Capital, and Location
S U P AU
Size
-25% -5.23 -4.67 70.39 -0.47
same -5.13 -4.64 81.96 0.11
+25% -5.06 -4.63 81.93 0.15
Housing Space/Land
3 -6.01 -5.47 83.09 -0.67
4 -5.13 -4.64 81.96 0.11
5 -4.61 -4.13 77.99 0.44
Location
3 miles -5.08 -4.78 86.45 0.25
4 miles -5.13 -4.64 81.96 0.11
5 miles -5.04 -4.46 68.04 -0.39
Vouchers
-2.84 -3.34 56.22 0.60
continuous variable. The implied parameters for the production function are a=0.70 and A=0.00149. Given the
change in tax base, we also recalibrate the parameters of the education production function to facilitate comparisons
with the models in Sections 3 and 4 of the paper. Further details are available from the authors.
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Table A.5: Models with Housing Industry II - Utility Parameters
Public Housing Vouchers
(αH , αL; τH , τL) S U P AU S U P AU
(.018, .014; 1.52, 1.04) -4.60 -3.29 79.97 0.97 -3.03 -2.94 56.16 0.73
(.021, .014; 1.97, 1.04) -5.13 -4.64 81.96 0.11 -2.84 -3.34 56.22 0.60
(.024, .014; 2.54, 1.04) -8.79 -17.81 46.27 -9.94 -3.12 -2.95 56.01 0.65
(.021, .012; 1.97, 0.84) -3.79 -3.66 67.26 0.54 -2.49 -3.16 56.69 0.87
(.021, .014; 1.97, 1.04) -5.13 -4.64 81.96 0.11 -2.84 -3.34 56.22 0.60
(.021, .016; 1.97, 1.26) -5.17 -4.02 89.61 0.75 -2.96 -3.00 56.16 0.72
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A.2 The Algorithm used for Solving the Benchmark Equilibrium
The following algorithm is based on the sequence of events described in the paper. Also see Figure
A1 below. The school district j could be East or West. If we know the bid-rent curve of a household
type in one district, we can draw the bid-rent curve for the same type in the other district as well,
since identical households obtain the same level of utility regardless of where they live.
1. Define model parameters and discretize the space.
2. Equation 3 (and some algebra) suggests that bid-rent curve Ψ1 of a household is steeper than
that Ψ2 of another if and only if for all r at which Ψ1(r, .) = Ψ2(r, .), η1+γ+δη1
η2
η2+γ+δ
(a+bW1)Y2(r)
(a+bW2)Y1(r)
> 1.
Moreover, the household with a steeper bid-rent curve locates closer to the employment center.
Check this ratio and determine the spatial order of households. In our paper, unskilled households
have a steeper bid-rent curve and locate closer to the employment center.
3. Randomize the initial tax rate/quality of education package in each district.
4. Initialize fringe distance, r∗fj . Find u
∗
S by using equation 3 in the paper and the fact that at
r∗fj , the rent is the agricultural rent Ra. Use this information to calculate bid-rent and lot sizes for
skilled households in both districts.
5. Initialize r∗SUj . Calculate the rent at r
∗
SUj by using the bid-rent function of skilled households.
Then find u∗U by using equation 3. Calculate bid-rent and lot sizes for unskilled households in both
districts.
6. Determine the land area that skilled households outbid unskilled households. By using lot sizes,
calculate the population of skilled households.
7. If it is larger (smaller) than the target value, go back to 5 and increase (decrease) r∗SUj . If it
equal to the target value, move on to the next step.
8. By using lot sizes, calculate the population of unskilled households. If it is larger (smaller) than
the target value, go back to 4 and decrease (increase) r∗fj . If it equal to the target value, move on
to the next step.
9. Find majority winner property tax rates, tax bases, and quality of education in each school
district.
10. Go back to step 3 and update tax rate/education package. Repeat until the current period tax
rate/education packages are equal to those in the last period.
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Figure A1
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